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Abstract
The article introduces an extension of the well-known conformance relation ioco on labeled transition
systems (LTS) with refused inputs and forbidden actions. This extension helps to apply the usual formal
testing theory based on LTS models to incompletely speciﬁed systems, which are often met in practice.
Another topic concerned in the article is compositional conformance. More precisely, we try to deﬁne a
completion operation that turns any LTS into input-enabled one having the same set of ioco-conforming
implementations. Such a completion enforces preservation of ioco conformance by parallel composition
operation on LTSes.
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1 Introduction
In the modern world a large part of human activities is controlled by various
computer-based systems. Reliability and quality of such systems become urgent
for dependable evolution of our society. One of the tools that help us to ensure sys-
tem quality is conformance testing. Conformance testing in general is an activity
that checks conformance between the real behavior of software or hardware sys-
tem and the requirements to this behavior. To make results of conformance testing
more sound and convincing the testing process needs in a formal framework, includ-
ing formalism for description of requirements and formal deﬁnition of conformance
relation.
1 This work is partially supported by RFBR grants 05-01-00999-a and 04-07-90386-b, by grant of Russian
Science Support Foundation, and by Program 4 of Mathematics Branch of RAS.
2 Email: igor@ispras.ru
3 Email: kos@ispras.ru
4 Email: kuliamin@ispras.ru
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 164 (2006) 83–96
1571-0661 © 2006 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2006.09.008
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
To make the reasoning about conformance rigorous one models both the actual
behavior of the system under test (SUT) and the requirements to it in some for-
malism. The choice of such formalism is directed by a class of systems we need to
describe with it. It is preferable to use a theory that allows reasoning about a wide
range of software and hardware systems of practical signiﬁcance. Labeled transition
systems (LTS) formalism is a good candidate, and it is used successfully for a long
time to model rather complex behavior of distributed software and hardware units,
including concurrency aspects. LTSes also serve as semantic metamodel for various
process calculi, such as CSP [1] and CCS [2], and for formal languages actively
applied in distributed software and hardware veriﬁcation, e.g. SDL, LOTOS, and
Estelle.
During testing one usually distinguishes between inputs and outputs of the SUT.
A tester provides the former to it, it provides the latter to the tester. So, LTS model
should be regarded as IOLTS, i.e. input-output labeled transition system, where
labels on transitions are partitioned into input and output symbols.
By a speciﬁcation one means a description of requirements to SUT’s behavior in
terms of the formalism chosen, e.g. an LTS modeling the required behavior. Since
the requirements are represented formally, one can speak about formal conformance
between them and the actual behavior of the SUT, but only if this actual behavior
also has some formal representation. Usually the basic test hypothesis states that
the actual behavior of the SUT can be adequately described by a model of the
same kind [3,4]. In our case this means that there exists an LTS, which is called an
implementation, adequately representing the real behavior of the SUT. One does
not know it exactly, but can reason on its properties on the base of observations of
the SUT’s behavior.
Many relations between LTSes can be chosen as conformance relations checked
in testing. [6] gives an extensive review of them. The choice of conformance rela-
tion depends on the testing abilities – abilities to control the SUT and to observe
various aspects of its behavior during testing. On the other hand, the testing abili-
ties determine properties of the system under test that can be checked. One of the
most useful and natural conformance relations used in testing is ioco, introduced
in works of Jan Tretmans [8,7]. He also developed the theory that helps to con-
struct test suites necessary and suﬃcient to check conformance between model and
implementation according to ioco.
1.1 ioco relation and its problems
ioco uses three rather natural and basic testing abilities – ability to provide inputs,
ability to observe outputs, and less obvious ability to observe a quiescence, a situ-
ation, in which the SUT will not provide any more output. Further observation of
a quiescence in traces is denoted as δ. In practice one usually supposes that there
exists some ﬁnite time T that in any state if no inputs are provided and the SUT is
going to provide an output, it always does this in a time less that T. This hypothesis
allows us to detect quiescence as the observation of no outputs during some timeout.
More attentive analysis of test abilities used by ioco gives two subtle issues.
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• We suppose that the implementation is input-enabled, i.e. in each stable state
(where there are no internal transitions) it has a transition for each input symbol.
Informally, an input-enabled system should always accept any input provided to
it. This may be reasonable when we test large components and systems as a
whole, because it is natural to them to process any possible inputs. But internal
components are often developed in collaborative mode, not the protective one,
and rely upon some restrictions on the input.
• We suppose that during testing we can prevent SUT from giving us an output,
if we want it to accept our input ﬁrst. This property follows from the semantics
of LTS interaction based on rendezvous mechanism. If we model testing as in-
teraction between an implementation LTS and a tester LTS by means of parallel
composition, we need to have in practice the special ability to prevent the SUT
from producing an output to the testing system if the testing system is not ready
to accept it.
Both issues were already mentioned by several authors, including Tretmans him-
self [8]. These assumptions give tester very high level of control over the SUT. The
second property is considered by some authors as particularly suspicious, since it
is rarely can be met in practice. Only in special contexts, for example, during
debugging, tester has enough control over the execution of the SUT to make this
assumption valid.
However, in the framework of LTS models the lack of control over SUT is the
consequence of the presence of some testing context, which represents the transport
mechanism, delivering actions from the tester to the SUT and backward. The
testing performed through some context is called asynchronous testing, while the
one giving the tester full control over the SUT is called synchronous. The second
issue can be interpreted that ioco is intended to be used in synchronous testing only.
If we need to check conformance between an implementation and a speciﬁcation by
means of testing through some context, it is natural to use the composition of
the LTS modeling the context with the original speciﬁcation as the speciﬁcation
of the observable SUT’s behavior and check its real behavior against the derived
speciﬁcation [4].
Here we face with a known problem of ioco – it is not preserved by the parallel
composition of LTSes, i.e. composition I‖Q of an implementation I conforming with
a speciﬁcation S and an LTS Q modeling the context may be not conforming with
S‖Q. Examples of such implementation and speciﬁcation can found in [9]. Another
example is shown on Fig. 1. The speciﬁcation S and the implementation I presented
there are ioco-conforming, but are not ioco-conforming if they are observed through
input and output queues (that is, being composed with two endless queues or even
queues of length 2). This problem seems to be a consequence of some bias of process
calculi to consider bisimulation relation as the most natural conformance relation
between processes. Parallel composition preserves bisimulation, which is thought
to be the desired relation between speciﬁcation and its implementation. However,
bisimulation is not testable in natural settings. During black-box testing we cannot
check it completely and often actually do not want to do it, because speciﬁcation
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may describe more general behavior, only a part of which should be realized in any
implementation.
Fig. 1. Example of ioco-conforming speciﬁcation and implementation, which are not ioco-conforming when
observed through queues.
So, to propose more practical conformance relation for the testing in context,
we can go in two ways.
• To consider some practical variants of contexts and develop testing framework
for them, including specialized conformance relations. This approach for context
modeled by inﬁnite or bounded input and output queues is presented in works of
Petrenko and Yevtushenko [10,11]. Another paper taking such an approach is [12]
where the authors propose to augment events provided by the SUT with special
stamps revealing the actual order of events in the SUT for tester. Such instru-
mentation makes another conformance relation, ioconf, also used in synchronous
testing, useful for the asynchronous one.
• To deﬁne more convenient composition operation that preserves conformance
relation, in so far that we can check the SUT’s behavior through any context
against the speciﬁcations composed with LTS modeling this context. This way
is chosen in recent works of Tretmans with co-authors [9]. It is shown there that
input-enabled ioco-conforming LTSes has no problems with composition – if both
the speciﬁcation and the implementation are completely speciﬁed and they are
ioco-conforming, then their compositions with any context LTS are also ioco-
conforming. So, the main problem to be overcome on the way to more convenient
composition is unspeciﬁed inputs. The demonic completion of speciﬁcation is
proposed in [9]. It forces unspeciﬁed inputs to take the speciﬁcation into special
chaotic state, where any behavior is possible. This is done to make any possible
SUT’s behavior in the unspeciﬁed area conforming to the completed speciﬁcation.
1.2 The proposed approach
We also would like to go in the second way, since it makes possible testing through
diﬀerent contexts, which is useful in practice. For example, contexts not preserving
the sequence of actions (as queues do) can be met in practical testing of Internet
protocols, components of GRID networks, and Web services. Instrumentation of
the SUT is not always possible, especially if it is distributed itself. On this way it
is reasonable ﬁrst to examine more thoroughly the meaning of unspeciﬁed inputs,
which are the main source of the problems with deﬁnition of ‘good’ composition
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operation.
One can notice that this issue is related with the implementation input-enabledness
hypothesis. Original deﬁnition of ioco is asymmetric in two ways – ﬁrst, it assumes
that an implementation should always accept inputs provided to it, while the tester
can abstain from acceptance of an implementation’s output, second, a speciﬁcation
can be partial and not input-enabled in contrast with an implementation. Both
sources of asymmetry can be removed if we allow an implementation also to be
partially deﬁned, not input-enabled.
One can ﬁnd the following ways of unspeciﬁed input understanding. Some of
them were already mentioned in the literature [13].
• Forbidden input. Such an input is forbidden to be provided to the SUT, due
to various reasons. It may cause serious destruction of the SUT, or move it
into a situation, which we want to avoid during testing, for example, divergence,
an inﬁnite path through internal actions. In fact, when demonic completion is
introduced, it means the same thing – we don’t want to check the behavior of the
SUT after accepting this input, but such a completion may cause us to perform
these unwanted checks.
We prefer to mark ‘bad’ situation we need to avoid with special forbidden action
label γ. Any input that can lead in the state where a forbidden action can occur
(maybe after a path through internal transitions) is considered as forbidden. The
same holds for outputs that can lead us to the state with a forbidden action. But
outputs in some state are under full control of the SUT – it is the SUT, which
choose an output to produce. So, we need to ban the mere waiting for an output
in states where some output can lead us to a forbidden action.
• Refused input. This input can be provided to the SUT and in response it demon-
strates refusal to accept it. Here we need the new testing ability to observe input
refusals. Refused inputs can model situations of practical signiﬁcance. For ex-
ample, tea-coﬀee machine having two buttons for requesting tea and coﬀee and a
slot for coin insertion may also have a special shutter closing the slot until some
button is pressed. When trying to insert a coin before pressing a button we may
observe that the coin is not taken. More practical example is given by Graphical
User Interface controls – menu item and buttons, which can be enabled or dis-
abled. In this case control’s disability means that the system refuses to accept
actions on this control.
Refused inputs are considered as particular case of refusals forming refusal
sets in [5,6] and some papers on conformance testing, e.g. [14] and works on
Multi Input-Output Transition Systems (MIOTS) [15,16,17]. In testing based on
MIOTS testing concerning input refusals attract more attention, since blocking
of one channel caused by a refused input can be resolved after accepting an input
on another channel. Here we do not need in detailed consideration of refusal sets
and pay more attention to refused inputs.
• Erroneous input. This is more subtle case. In some situations we can provide an
input to the SUT, but the fact that the SUT has accepted it says that it is not
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conforming to the speciﬁcation. Consider the example presented on Fig. 2. In the
speciﬁcation LTS presented there δ-trace δ?aδ ends in the state where input a is
not speciﬁed. And its subtraces δ?a and ?aδ end in states where input a is deﬁned,
but is followed by diﬀerent outputs. So, what if we observe the trace δ?aδ in the
implementation and then provide an input a? The conforming implementation
should be input-enabled and it should accept a, by it cannot provide neither x,
nor y, nor it can demonstrate quiescence in response. Otherwise, if it has the trace
δ?aδ?aδ, it should have δ?a?aδ, which is absent in the current speciﬁcation, if it
has the trace δ?aδ?a!x, it should have ?aδ?a!x, which is also absent, and if it has
the trace δ?aδ?a!y, it should have δ?a?a!y, which is absent in speciﬁcation again.
So, the only reasonable conclusion is that this implementation is not conforming
to the speciﬁcation presented, just after it demonstrated the trace δ?aδ?a. The
last input a is erroneous in the sense that any possible behavior after it (any
output or refusal) cannot be observed in the conforming implementation.
We model such an input as leading to a separate state with the single out-
going transition marked with special an error output. This construction will be
necessary in consideration of possible completion operations for LTSes.
Fig. 2. Example of the speciﬁcation having the trace δ?aδ that should not exist in any ioco-conforming
implementation.
• Unspeciﬁed input can be considered as doing nothing and so corresponding to a
self-loop transition (so called ‘angelic’ behavior). We think, however, that such
inputs should be speciﬁed in an accurate speciﬁcation and it should be tested
that they actually do nothing. To make an input unspeciﬁed there must be more
serious reasons (see above).
Bearing in mind all the listed possibilities, we do the following.
(i) Deﬁne an extension of ioco relation for LTSes that can have forbidden actions
and refused inputs. Error output is an auxiliary mark to check conformance.
This relation is designated as iocoβγδ in this paper.
(ii) Since parallel composition of LTSes breaks ioco only on partially speciﬁed LT-
Ses, we need to deﬁne some completion of the original LTS before composition.
This completion from one hand should give an input-enabled LTS, and from
the other hand the original LTS and the completed one should have the same
set of ioco-conforming implementations.
Next sections of the article present the implementation of those steps. It seems
that the main contribution of this paper is direct introduction of forbidden actions
into the deﬁnition of conformance relation and construction of the corresponding
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completion operation disallowing processing of inputs unspeciﬁed in the original
LTS.
2 Extended ioco Conformance Relation
Below we recall some part of LTS-based formalism and usual arrow notation.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An LTS is a tuple L = (Q,C, T, q0) where
• Q is non-empty set of states;
• C = I ∪ U is a set of symbols, I consists of input symbols, U is disjoint from I
and consists of output symbols;
• T ⊆ Q × (C ∪ {τ, γ}) × Q is a set of transitions. A transition (q, a, q′) starts
in the state q, ends in the state q′, and is marked with the label a. We use labels
with question mark (?a) to denote input symbols and labels with exclamation mark
(!x) to denote output symbols. τ /∈ I ∪U is considered as empty symbol marking
internal transitions. γ /∈ I ∪ U, γ = τ is considered as forbidden action symbol.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
We denote the fact that in an LTS L (q, x, q′) ∈ TL as q
x
−→ q′. q
x
−→ denotes
∃q′ ∈ Q q
x
−→ q′. q
x
−→ denotes ∀q′ ∈ Q (q, x, q′) ∈ TL. By a stable state we mean a
state q such that q
τ
−→ ∧q
γ
−→ .
LTS can be partially speciﬁed, i.e. it can have states where not all inputs are
possible. However, we can consider it as completely speciﬁed due to the following
interpretation. If for a stable state q q
?a
−→, we may mean that this ?a can be given
in q and the LTS should demonstrate refusal to accept it in response to this. For
an input symbol ?a we denote refusal of this input as {?a}. In addition to input
symbols, output symbols, empty symbol, and forbidden action we use symbol δ to
denote quiescence, i.e. situation where LTS does not have any transitions marked
with output symbols, γ, or τ. Input refusals and quiescence together are called
refusals.
We call an LTS L strongly convergent if it does not have inﬁnite paths through
internal transitions. It is possible to convert any LTS into strongly convergent one
by replacing the symbol τ on the transitions of every such path with γ. From testing
viewpoint this means that we avoid actions that can lead us to such a path. Further
we consider only strongly convergent LTSes.
We can transform an original LTS by converting convergence into forbidden
actions, making all transitions marked with γ to lead into a special additional state,
and adding refusal transitions as self-loops in stable states. An example of such a
transformation is shown on Fig. 3.
By βγδ-traces in alphabet I ∪ U we mean sequences consisting of input and
output symbols, γ and refusal symbols – δ and refusals of input symbols. We
denote concatenation of traces σ and μ by σμ. μ  σ denotes that μ is a beginning
of σ. If s is input, output, input refusal symbol, γ or δ, then 〈s〉 means the sequence
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Fig. 3. Example of transformation making refusals explicit and adding a special state to go after forbidden
actions.
with the single element s.
A run of LTS L starting in a state q is a sequence of transitions of L, transformed
according to the procedure described above, the ﬁrst of which starts in q, and each
next transition starts in the end state of the previous. A βγδ-trace of a run p is a
sequence of labels of transitions of p, from which all symbols τ are skipped.
One can see that each time when p goes through a stable state without outgoing
output transitions, δ may be inserted in the corresponding place several times.
Similarly, each time when p goes through a stable state without outgoing transition
marked with input symbol ?a, the symbol {?a} may be inserted in the corresponding
place several times. According to the transformation rules the ﬁrst γ met in βγδ-
trace is always the last symbol – there is no need to extend a βγδ-trace after the
ﬁrst forbidden action in it. The set of all the βγδ-traces of runs of L starting in a
state q is denoted as Tracesβγδ(q, L). T racesβγδ(L) is Tracesβγδ(q0, L).
If σ is a βγδ-trace of LTS L then Lafterσ is a set of all states of L that can be
reached by paths having σ as their βγδ-trace.
We need the notion of safe actions, which makes us safe from triggering a for-
bidden action. An input symbol ?x or its refusal are called safe in LTS L after a
βγδ-trace σ if ∀q ∈ (Lafterσ〈?x〉) q
γ
−→ . An output symbol or δ is said to be
safe in L after its trace σ if ∀!x ∈ U∀q ∈ (Lafterσ〈!x〉) q
γ
−→ . A βγδ-trace σ
of L is safe if each its symbol is safe in L after the beginning of σ preceding this
symbol. A set of all safe βγδ-traces of L is denoted as Safe(L). We also call an
extension of a safe trace σ of L with a safe symbol in L after σ a test trace of
L. A set of all test βγδ-traces of L is denoted as TT (L). It is easy to note that
TT (L) ∩ Tracesβγδ(L) = Safe(L).
Consider again speciﬁcation LTS S and implementation LTS I. We may perform
testing according to S only if we are sure that I operates properly during this
process. In ioco theory this is guaranteed by the input-enabledness of I. Although
we ease this assumption, we still need some safety hypothesis about I. This leads
us to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.2 If I and S are LTSes, I is said to be safe for S if TT (S) ∩
Tracesβγδ(I) ⊆ Safe(I).
This deﬁnition says that if we construct a test avoiding possibility of forbidden
action occurrence in a speciﬁcation, its application to any implementation safe for
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this speciﬁcation cannot lead to forbidden action too. So, implementations safe for
a speciﬁcation can be safely tested according to it.
Now we are ready to give the deﬁnition of iocoβγδ relation.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let I and S are LTSes. Then I iocoβγδ S if and only if I is safe
for S and for each βγδ-trace σ ∈ Safe(S) and for each symbol s (including refusals)
safe in S after σ σ〈s〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(I) ⇒ σ〈s〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S).
More ﬁne (but less intuitive) expression of this fact can be given by the expression
TT (S) ∩ Tracesβγδ(I) ⊆ Tracesβγδ(S) ∩ TT (I). Informally, an implementation I
safe for S is said to be iocoβγδ-conforming to S when after an S-safe trace I can
accept an input symbol, give an output symbol, demonstrate a quiescence, or input
refusal only if S can do just the same thing after the same trace.
It is easy to show that iocoβγδ deﬁnes a preorder on LTSes. Note, that classic
ioco is not a ‘good’ preorder, since it imposes asymmetric restrictions on imple-
mentation and speciﬁcation. While the latter can be incompletely speciﬁed, the
former should not. The fact that for speciﬁcations without forbidden actions and
input refusals (usual completely speciﬁed LTSes) iocoβγδ is equivalent to ioco is
also rather obvious. In this case they both are equivalent to trace inclusion.
2.1 Test Derivation
During testing we should check SUT’s behavior on every trace that is safe in the
speciﬁcation. Moreover, we should check it for all the symbols safe after such a trace
in the speciﬁcation. As usual we model test cases by LTSes with inverted inputs
and outputs – inputs of the speciﬁcation become outputs of a test case, outputs
of the speciﬁcation (and implementation) are inputs of a test case. In addition,
the symbol θ is used to mark deadlock resolution transitions in a test case. θ is
considered as input symbol and means observation of quiescence in the test case
states where any SUT’s outputs can be accepted or observation of an input refusal
in the test case states where a speciﬁcation’s input symbol is provided by the test.
A test case has two special states fail and pass without outgoing transitions.
Other constraints on test case LTS are given below.
• Each maximal trace of a test case should be ﬁnite and should end either in the
fail state or in the pass state.
• A test case should resolve all possible deadlocks in its interaction with an imple-
mentation. If in some state q of a test case there exists a ∈ I q
!a
−→, then q
θ
−→,
which ﬁres if the input a is refused by the SUT. If in some state q of a test case
for all x ∈ U q
?x
−→, then q
θ
−→, which ﬁres if no output is observed.
• A test case should be deterministic as much as it is possible. Each its state
should be an input state or an output state. An input state should have outgoing
transitions marked with all possible SUT’s outputs and θ. An output state should
have only one outgoing transition marked with some input of the speciﬁcation and
one outgoing transition marked with θ.
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An implementation LTS I passes a test case T if their parallel composition
(extended by correlating θ in the test case with δ and input refusals in the imple-
mentation) has no states with fail component achievable from the initial state. A
test suite for a speciﬁcation S is a set of test cases for S. An implementation passes
a test suite if it passes each its test case. A test suite is called sound for a speciﬁ-
cation S if any iocoβγδ-conforming implementation passes it, and exhaustive for S
if any implementation passing it is iocoβγδ-conforming to S. Sound and exhaustive
test suite is called complete.
Theorem 2.4 Let us denote a set of safe ﬁnite βγδ-traces of a speciﬁcation S as
Safef (S). For each trace σ ∈ Safef (S) construct a test case T (σ) with the help of
the following transformations.
• Take a sequence of symbols of σ, construct an inverted symbol for each (?a →
!a, !x →?x, δ → θ, {?a} → θ), and make the sequence of transitions marked
with the resulting symbols. Let us denote a state of this LTS by μ¯, where μ is the
corresponding preﬁx of σ. σ¯ should be pass.
• For each preﬁx μ of σ and symbol s such that μ〈s〉  σ we add new transitions.
There are several possibilities listed below. For each case we consider possible
extensions of μ with alternatives to s. If s is an input, its alternative is the corre-
sponding input refusal, and the alternative to an input refusal is the corresponding
input. Alternatives to an output are all other output symbols from the alphabet
and quiescence, and alternatives to δ are all output symbols. For each alternative
to s we should add an additional transition to our test case. If this alternative is
possible into the speciﬁcation (the trace μ can have several diﬀerent extensions in
the speciﬁcation), we add the corresponding transition leading to pass, otherwise
it should lead to fail. More precise rules are given in the following list.
· ?s ∈ I. Then, add a transition μ¯
θ
−→ pass, if μ〈{?s}〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S) and
μ¯
θ
−→ fail otherwise.
· s is {?r}, where ?r ∈ I. Then, add a transition μ¯
!r
−→ pass, if μ〈?r〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S)
and μ¯
!r
−→ fail otherwise.
· !s ∈ U. Then any !r ∈ U, !r = !s and δ are safe in S after μ. Add a transition
μ¯
?r
−→ pass, if μ〈!r〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S) and μ¯
?r
−→ fail otherwise. Also add a
transition μ¯
θ
−→ pass, if μ〈δ〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S) and μ¯
θ
−→ fail otherwise.
· s is δ. Then any !r ∈ U is safe after μ in S. Add a transition μ¯
?r
−→ pass, if
μ〈!r〉 ∈ Tracesβγδ(S) and μ¯
?r
−→ fail otherwise.
Then T (Safef (S)) is a complete test suite for S.
Soundness of test cases from T (Safef (S)) is implied by their construction –
if the composition of such a test and an implementation comes to a state with
fail component, then the implementation has a trace that does not exist in the
speciﬁcation. To prove the exhaustiveness of the constructed test suite one should
take an implementation that does not conform to the speciﬁcation, found a safe
trace σ in the speciﬁcation that can be extended in the implementation by a safe
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symbol s, for which σ〈s〉 /∈ Tracesβγδ(S) holds. Then, it is suﬃcient to consider
the test case constructed for σ extended with an alternative to s, which is a safe
trace in S. The implementation chosen cannot pass this test case. More details of
the proof can be found in [18].
3 Completion Operations
The next step is to deﬁne such a completion operation Comp for LTSes, that for
each LTS S Comp(S) is input-enabled and has the same set of iocoβγδ-conforming
implementations. Results presented further are partial. Only a solution for clas-
sic ioco relation is given. The authors are working now on the full completion
operation, but have no compact and proved construction for it.
In [9] the demonic completion Ξ is deﬁned as a candidate of the needed comple-
tion for ioco. However, as it is also noted there, this completion does not preserve
full information on unspeciﬁed inputs. Moreover, demonic completion from [9] is
state completion – it deﬁnes some additional behavior after an input in some state
– and just this fact makes it slightly inadequate. State completions can make non-
conforming implementation conforming, as it is mentioned in [12]. Fig. 4 shows an
example of speciﬁcation S and implementation I such that I iocoS does not hold,
but I iocoΞ(S).
Fig. 4. Example of the speciﬁcation, for which Ξ changes the ioco relation. The ‘correct’ completion variants
Δ and Γ are also presented.
The same Fig. 4 also presents the examples of Δ and Γ completions deﬁned
below. They both are more suitable completion operations, not extending the set
of ioco-conforming implementations. On this ﬁgure additional transitions added by
completion operations are shown as hatch lines.
We propose two completion operations, Δ and Γ, that diﬀers in interpretation
of unspeciﬁed inputs in the original LTS. Δ-completion treats them as leading into
the states where any possible behavior can be observed, but they can be given to
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the completed LTS. Γ-completion treats them as forbidden inputs, which should
not be provided during testing at all.
The main ideas are the following. At ﬁrst we construct a basic completion,
which augments an LTS with additional transitions and states that do not change
the set of traces and protects the LTS from extending the set of ioco-conforming
implementations by the further state completion. On Fig. 4 transitions added by
basic completion are shown as small-hatch lines. Then, we perform state completion
according to the operation used – for Δ-completion we add all possible behaviors
after all inputs that remained unspeciﬁed after the ﬁrst step, for Γ-completion we
add γ transitions after those inputs. On Fig. 4 transitions added by Δ- or Gamma-
completions are shown as long-hatch lines.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Basic completion operation Bc transforms an LTS with states Q,
inputs I and outputs U in the following way. The resulting LTS Bc(L) has the states
corresponding to C∗δ – all possible sequences of symbols from I ∪ U ∪ {δ}. Inputs of
Bc(L) coincide with L, and outputs are U ∪{!error}. For each σ ∈ C∗δ R(σ) denotes
the set of δ-traces of L obtained from σ by deletion some or all δ symbols. The set
of transitions is the minimal set derived from the following rules.
• ∀?a ∈ I ∃μ ∈ R(σ) μ〈?a〉 ∈ Tracesδ(L) ⇒ σ
?a
−→ σ〈?a〉 in Bc(L).
• ∀!x ∈ U ∀μ ∈ R(σ) μ〈!x〉 ∈ Tracesδ(L) ⇒ σ
!x
−→ σ〈!x〉 in Bc(L).
• ∀μ ∈ R(σ) μ〈δ〉 ∈ Tracesδ(L) ∧ σ does not end on δ ⇒ σ
τ
−→ σ〈δ〉 in Bc(L).
• ∀μ ∈ R(σ)∀!x ∈ U μ〈!x〉 ∈ Tracesδ(L)∧μ〈δ〉 ∈ Tracesδ(L) ⇒ σ
!error
−−−−→ σ〈!error〉
in Bc(L).
Δ-completion of an LTS L is constructed as completion of Bc(L) with two states
qU and qI demonstrating all possible behaviors, i.e. qU
τ
−→ qI and ∀!x ∈ U qU
!x
−→ qU
and ∀?a ∈ I qI
?a
−→ qU . For each state q of Bc(L) and each ?a ∈ I if q
?a
−→ in Bc(L)
then q
?a
−→ qU in Δ(L).
Γ-completion of an LTS L is constructed as completion of Bc(L) with one state
qγ having γ-self-loop. For each state q of Bc(L) and each ?a ∈ I if q
?a
−→ in Bc(L)
then q
?a
−→ qγ in Γ(L).
Theorem 3.2 Δ and Γ turn any LTS S into input-enabled one and preserve the
set of ioco-conforming implementations, i.e.
∀I I iocoS ⇔ I iocoΔ(S) ⇔ I iocoΓ(S).
We need to skip the proof (see its details in [18]) due to restrictions on the size
of the paper.
The two completions deﬁned can be used to describe relation between classic
ioco and iocoβγδ introduced above. To formulate this relation we ﬁrst note that
ioco conformance to a speciﬁcation S can be naturally extended on the set Iγ(S) of
LTSes that may have refused inputs and forbidden actions, but satisfy the following
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conditions.
• Empty trace is safe in any I ∈ Iγ(S).
• Let us call βγδ-trace without input refusals and γ δ-traces and denote the set of
all δ-traces of an LTS L as Tracesδ(L). For each σ, which is δ-trace of both S
and I ∈ Iγ(S), any output should be safe in I ∈ Iγ(S) after σ.
• For each σ, which is δ-trace of both S and I ∈ Iγ(S), and each input ?a, which
can extend σ in the speciﬁcation (that is, σ〈?a〉 ∈ Tracesδ(S)), ?a should be safe
in I ∈ Iγ(S) after σ and σ〈?a〉 should also be a δ-trace of I.
For I ∈ Iγ(S) we can say that I iocoS if and only if for each σ ∈ Tracesδ(S) and
for each s ∈ U ∪ {δ} σ〈s〉 ∈ Tracesδ(I) ⇒ σ〈s〉 ∈ Tracesδ(S).
Theorem 3.3 • For each speciﬁcation S without forbidden actions and completely
deﬁned implementation I without forbidden actions (the domain of the classic
ioco)
I iocoS ⇔ I iocoβγδ Δ(S) ⇔ I iocoβγδ Γ(S).
• For each speciﬁcation S without forbidden actions and I ∈ Iγ(S)
I iocoS ⇔ I iocoβγδ Γ(S).
The proof of this statement can also be found in [18]. Note, that in the sec-
ond case Γ(S) cannot be substituted by Δ(S), since implementations from Iγ(S)
nonconforming to S may conform to Δ(S).
4 Conclusion
The main results of this paper are deﬁnition of a conformance relation iocoβγδ
introducing semantics of forbidden actions and refused inputs into conformance
testing theory based on LTS models and construction of two completion operation
that transform any LTS into the input-enabled ones having the same sets of ioco-
conforming implementations. The second result makes possible deﬁnition of ‘proper’
LTS composition preserving ioco-conformance.
Nevertheless, the problems stated in the end of Introduction are not solved com-
pletely. We have no compact construction of the analogous completion preserving
the set of iocoβγδ-conforming implementations for an LTS with refused inputs. This
construction is under development now.
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